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Abstract 
This paper provides several econometric analyses in order to disclose the determinants of the 
probability of defaulting on financial obligations and of the level of debt and expenses 
burdens for Portuguese families. The study was developed using data collected by DECO, a 
Portuguese consumer association. We run several regressions using demographic variables 
and over-indebtedness triggers and look for the robustness of results. We find that 
unemployment and family composition are the most significant and consistent determinants 
of our outcome variables and most of our empirical findings are backed up by previous 
studies. 
Keywords: over-indebtedness, default, Portugal, DECO 
 
1. Introduction  
Over the last years, the importance given to households’ over-indebtedness and financial 
literacy has been increasing, especially after the Financial crisis of 2007–2008 (OECD/INFE, 
2009). To understand and measure such concepts is of the utmost importance, as they are an 
integral part of the financial system’s stability (OECD/INFE, 2016), which has led 
institutions such as the OECD/INFE and the DG SANCO to address these topics. 
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According to Eurostat, in 2015, 26,6% of Portugal’s population was at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion, 2,9% more than the EU average (Eurostat, 2016). In 2015, the Bank of 
Portugal conducted the 2nd Financial Literacy Survey of the Portuguese population, which 
revealed that the general numeracy and financial products knowledge of the population has 
severe shortcomings, confirming the conclusion reached in the 1st wave of the survey (Bank 
of Portugal, 2016). Within this 5-year period, the number of households with financial 
problems requesting assistance from DECO (Portuguese Association for Consumer 
Protection) grew from 11.960 to 29.214, a 144% increase (DECO, 2016), while the number 
of firm insolvency cases in Portugal increased 709% (DGPJ, 2016). These statistics reflect 
the severity of the Portuguese households’ current financial situation and literacy.  
The literature uses three different definitions of over-indebtedness (Ferreira, 2000): a 
subjective, a quantitative/objective and an administrative model. Betti et al. (2007) adopted 
a subjective model that depends on the household’s judgement, i.e., over-indebted 
households are “those that expressed difficulty or serious difficulty in making debt payments, 
including credit debt, mortgage payments and hire purchase installments as recorded in 
household surveys” (Betti et al., 2007: 144). An objective definition makes use of indicators 
with established thresholds to determine if the household is over-indebted. Examples of such 
indicators are the number of credit commitments, debt-to-income ratios or number of arrears 
on a credit commitment, as used by d’Alessio et al. (2013). These quantitative measures 
provide a more objective mechanism for defining over-indebtedness; yet, critical levels may 
be difficult to define and may seem somewhat arbitrary (Betti et al., 2007). The 
administrative approach is associated with the judicial system and states that over-
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indebtedness is a situation where the inability to pay off debts has been pronounced before a 
court, i.e., the household has declared bankruptcy.  
In this work we adopt a subjective approach, as over-indebted households are those seeking 
the assistance of GAS (Gabinete de Apoio ao Sobre-endividado, a division of DECO that 
helps households with over-indebtedness problems). The reasoning is that, if households look 
for GAS’s help it is because they perceive themselves as over-indebted, acknowledging their 
difficulty in making debt or utility bills payments. We may trust the truthfulness of these 
households’ situation for two main reasons. Firstly, being over-indebted is usually perceived 
as a shameful situation that contributes to a feeling of second-class citizenship (Persson, 
2007). Secondly, since GAS does not provide monetary aid to households, there is no 
incentive to seek assistance for those who are not facing difficulties. 
The problem of over-indebtedness can generate a reduction in consumption below the 
household’s desired level and may even deprive its members of some basic goods. In the 
long term, the accumulation of debt can lead to financial fragility, social exclusion and even 
poverty (d’Alessio et al., 2013). The issue has been associated to lack of financial literacy 
(Casagrande, 2016) and liquidity constraints (Betti et al., 2007), which can be tackled through 
appropriate policies. 
This research was developed in partnership with DECO’s Gabinete de Apoio ao Sobre-
endividado (GAS). We use a sample of 6.479 households that sought GAS’s assistance from 
its database.1 Our contribution is twofold: on the one hand, we do a thorough preparation of 
the database for research purposes, including the creation of a newly “over-indebtedness 
                                                          
1 The database provided contained a total of 17.470 households. However, only 6.479 gathered the detailed 
demographic and financial information that was necessary to conduct this study. 
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trigger” variable that we recovered from an open text answer. On the other hand, we provide 
several econometric analyses in order to disclose the determinants of the probability of 
defaulting on financial obligations and of the level of debt and expenses burdens. These 
determinants include not only demographic variables but also over-indebtedness triggers that 
have occurred to households (such as unemployment, divorce or own company bankruptcy).  
The next section of the paper browses existing literature on the topic. An overview of DECO 
and GAS is provided in section 3. Section 4 exposes relevant information concerning the 
data, such as the data collection process, how data was treated and the data itself. Results of 
the analysis are presented in section 5 and section 6 outlines the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of over indebtedness has spawned a vast literature on the topic, with several 
approaches, types of data, and techniques, of which we now provide a brief overview.  Betti 
et al. (2007) suggest that the differences arise because of the “intrinsic conceptual difficulty” 
and lack of detailed household data. In their paper they use micro-data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) and the (European) Household Budget 
Surveys (HBS) for the year 1996 to examine indebtedness across several EU countries 
(including Portugal) while adopting the life-cycle-permanent-income framework.2 The 
results are broadly consistent with the model, but distinct for high and low-borrowing 
countries. In the latter, over-indebtedness appears to be more problematic mainly due to 
                                                          
2 According to this model, being indebted is a natural and rational circumstance in which households try to 
smooth consumption over their lifetime. Such a circumstance only becomes a problem when it leads to over-
indebtedness, which is only caused if an unexpected shock appears or if the consumer has a myopic view of 
resources (behavior in which a person mismanages its resources by being short-sighted, which can exist in the 
form of extreme risk aversion or extreme risk taking). 
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liquidity constraints. Likewise, Russell et al. (2012) found that financial exclusion has a 
positive impact on debt levels using data for Ireland from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
In Germany, Keese (2009) relates income and debt services to different concepts of 
subsistence levels with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The paper 
addresses the impact of unexpected shocks (i.e., trigger events) and shows that household’s 
indebtedness is most affected by unemployment, childbirth and death, divorce or separation. 
The same author, in a paper from 2012, also confirms that the debt burden of households is 
influenced by future expectations regarding the personal and socio-economic environment 
(Keese, 2012).  
The relationships between compulsive buying and debt have also been analyzed in several 
papers. Using SOEP data, Achtziger et al. (2015) showed that compulsive buying has a 
positive impact on debt, while self-control has a negative one. Furthermore, it was found that 
women are more likely to buy compulsively and that age has a positive relation with self-
control. In a similar analysis for the UK, Gathergood (2012) shows that financial illiteracy 
and lack of self-control are positively linked to excessive debt burdens and a higher exposure 
to risks, due to a higher probability of credit withdrawals and income shocks. In 2016, 
Casagrande (2016) analyzed the impact of financial literacy on over-indebted Portuguese 
families, in partnership with DECO.3 The findings suggest that financial literacy has a 
significant impact on the probability of being over-indebted and that the relationship between 
the two variables is mediated by the level of education. 
                                                          
3 The data was collected via a survey that tested households’ financial literacy and distributed among the 
households in DECO’s database. 
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Similarly, Lusardi et al. (2015) conducted a study on debt literacy with a sample of the 
American population and found that approximately one-third of the population understands 
what interest compounding is, or how credit cards work. Like the other authors already 
mentioned, they also found a positive relationship between the financial illiteracy and debt 
burden. Oksanen et al. (2015) analyzed debt problems in Finland between 2005 and 2013 
using a random sample of the Finnish population and found that prior criminal convictions 
are associated with higher debt related problems. 
With Italian data from 2010, d’Alessio et al. (2013) compared a list of indicators (mostly 
objective ones) that capture different dimensions of over-indebtedness4 and found that the 
debt-poverty indicator is the one that best detects over-indebtedness situations. For each, they 
establish a threshold that dictates whether or not the household is over-indebted and then 
proceed to test the indicators’ predictive performance by changing its cut points. The problem 
with these objective definitions of over-indebtedness is that sometimes, being above the 
threshold does not necessarily mean a situation of over-indebtedness. Even for a very high 
debt-to-income ratio, households may have a high enough income that they are able to service 
the debt without feeling overwhelmed by it.  In the same line of reasoning, households can 
have a number of loans below the threshold, but with total outstanding debt above their 
repayment possibilities. Despite this limitation, debt and expenses-to-income ratios are used 
in this paper to measure the household’s level of over-indebtedness, as they are a useful 
complement to our subjective definition. 
 
                                                          
4 Examples of such indicators are debt-to-income ratios, number of arrears or number of loans. 
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3. DECO and GAS overview 
DECO, also known as the Portuguese Association for Consumer Protection, is an 
independent and non-profit consumer association with over 40 years of intervention. With 
headquarters in Lisbon and delegations in six other regions of Portugal, it is the largest and 
most recognized association of its kind whose main objectives are defending the rights and 
interests of consumers and providing a better access to information. Its main activities include 
consumer’s advice, support and representation, dispute resolution and publication of test 
magazines and guides (DECO, 2016). 
In the year 2000 DECO founded GAS, a division with the objective of counselling consumers 
with over-indebtedness problems. Its work consists in providing support and advice to 
households that are over-indebted and increasing consumer’s financial literacy by publishing 
articles about topics such as household budgeting, savings on daily expenses and 
investments. 
To request GAS’s help, a household member has to register in its website and fill in a form, 
and in cases where households do not have access to internet, a personal meeting with a GAS 
member is scheduled. After submitting the information, the household’s situation is analyzed 
and prioritized according to its severity. The first step of the process is to contact the credit 
institutions or service providers to suggest a restructuring of the credit agreements or 
contracts that allows the consumers to comply with their financial obligations. If a consensus 
is not reached, GAS often suggests households to open an insolvency proceeding, while 
providing legal advice, support and guidance during the process. It should be noted that GAS 
does not provide its services to everyone who is over-indebted. It does so to individuals 
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whose excessive debt situation arises from involuntary acts or situations such as 
unemployment, income reduction or disease. Debts of fiscal nature (income taxes, value 
added taxes and alike) or related to business activities are out of GAS’s scope. They must be 
of non-professional nature and related to credit entities or service providers, such as 
telecommunications or electricity companies (GAS, 2016). 
4. The Data 
The data used in this paper was provided by GAS and collected between 2012 and 2015. The 
following topics elaborate on the data collection and treatment, and provide some descriptive 
statistics. 
4.1. Data collection and Data treatment 
When households request GAS’s assistance by filling in the form in its website, they are 
required to provide several information such as their income level, amount of expenses and 
installments, whether or not they are defaulting on financial obligations and demographic 
variables such as age, professional status and education. When households do not have access 
to the internet, this information is provided personally in a meeting with a GAS member. The 
data provided by each household is then added to a database that has all the information 
previously collected. 
While browsing through GAS’s database, we came across two problems concerning the data. 
First, there was missing data given that some consumers preferred not to reveal information 
on topics such as job status, marital status or education. Since these observations usually had 
several missing variables, we ignored them, as estimating the missing values would have 
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introduced bias into the data set. Thus, we sampled 6.479 observations/households from the 
database, as this was the number of households that disclosed all the necessary information. 
The second problem was the existence of outliers. There were observations with expenses or 
installments whose amount was above 1 million euros; others had incongruent figures, with 
amounts of installments higher than the amounts of credit. These amounts to 110 
observations, which were dropped from the sample. In addition, 128 households reported too 
low values of income, such as 0,01€ or 0,10€, which we considered data typos. We 
winsorized these 128 observations by setting them to the 2nd percentile. Our final sample is 
therefore composed by 6.369 observations. 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the overall sample used in this study can be seen in Table 1. In 
Appendix 1, a descriptive statistics that distinguishes households with and without bank loans 
(named group A and group B, respectively) is also provided, along with the t-test results for 
comparison purposes.  
In Table 1, we present the figures for income along with the equivalent income, which adjusts 
the household’s income level by dividing it by the square root of its number of elements. We 
computed total installments by summing all the listed types of installments and the same 
reasoning was applied for expenses. These amounts were then divided by income to compute 
the corresponding debt and expenses burdens, which we use as our independent variables in 
sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. 
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5 Fixed expenses include rent, utility bills (electricity, water, cable…), food and clothing. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 







Income 6.369 1.069,02 746,99 42,28 17.095,00 




Fixed5 6.369 113,10 136,81 0,00 1.433,00 
Transportation 6.369 40,79 115,66 0,00 2.400,00 
Education 6.369 14,06 73,26 0,00 2.316,00 
Taxes 6.369 38,00 80,89 0,00 3.577,59 
Health 6.369 509,83 397,36 0,00 18.211,00 
Incidental 6.369 34,78 120,01 0,00 2.600,00 
Telecommunications 6.369 47,74 40,24 0,00 750,00 




Housing 6.369 179,38 273,63 0,00 6.707,18 
Car 6.369 91,22 985,17 0,00 48.112,05 
Personal 6.369 307,51 1.145,45 0,00 34.482,00 
Credit Card 6.369 276,36 774,68 0,00 17.263,01 
Other 6.369 44,63 309,18 0,00 11.463,00 
Total Installments 6.369 899,10 1.855,24 0,00 51.521,46 
Burdens (%) 
Expenses 6.369 120,03 282,05 0,43 5.228,78 
Debt (Service) 6.369 115,84 319,03 0,00 8.362,07 
With Bank Loans 6.369 0,92 0,27 0 1 
Defaulting on Financial Obligations 6.369 0,58 0,49 0 1 
Age 
Age 6.369 47,62 11,95 21 98 
Age2 6.369 2.410,07 1.213,32 441 9.604 
Job Status 
Unemployed 6.369 0,27 0,44 0 1 
Employed 6.369 0,60 0,49 0 1 
Education 
At most Basic Education 6.369 0,48 0,50 0 1 
Higher Education 6.369 0,15 0,36 0 1 
Family 
Composition 
With Children 6.369 0,57 0,50 0 1 
Married 6.369 0,55 0,50 0 1 
Number of children 6.369 0,87 0,92 0 6 
Number of adults 6.369 1.67 0,61  1 7 




Unemployment 6.369 0,32 0,47 0 1 
Income Reduction 6.369 0,32 0,47 0 1 
Family Increase 6.369 0,06 0,23 0 1 
Family Decrease 6.369 0,07 0,25 0 1 
Disease 6.369 0,12 0,32 0 1 
Guarantor 6.369 0,02 0,15 0 1 
Own Company Bankruptcy 6.369 0,04 0,20 0 1 
Poor Management 6.369 0,15 0,35 0 1 
Unknown 6.369 0,19  0,39 0 1 
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The variable “Defaulting on Financial Obligations” and “With Bank Loans” are both dummy 
variables used in section 5.2., where we show the determinants of the probability of 
defaulting. The former is the independent variable and takes the value of 1 if the household 
is defaulting on at least one financial obligation, i.e., installments or utility bills, and 0 
otherwise, and the latter is one of the explanatory variables which takes the value of 1 if the 
household has at least one bank loan, and 0 otherwise.  
The demographic variables (age, job status, education and family composition) refer to the 
declarant, i.e., the person that contacted GAS and provided the information. Demographic 
dummy variables are explained in Table 2. 
 
The over-indebtedness triggers, as mentioned in the introduction, were created based on an 
open text answer which was included in GAS’s form. This open text answer allows 
households to provide a brief explanation of their situation, and by using string functions we 
were able to detect and assign one or more triggers to each household according to it. For 
example, for the trigger unemployment we looked for words such as “unemployed” or 
“fired”; for the trigger disease, we looked for words such as “disease”, “illness” or 
“disability” and the same reasoning applies to the other ones. The unknown trigger was 
Table 2: Demographic dummy variables 
Unemployed 1 if the declarant is unemployed, 0 if employed or retired 
Employed 1 if the declarant is employed, 0 if unemployed or retired 
At most Basic Education 1 if the declarant has at most the 9th grade, 0 otherwise 
Higher Education 1 if the declarant has a bachelors, masters or PhD degree, 0 otherwise 
With Children 1 if the declarant has at least one child, 0 otherwise 
Married 1 if the declarant is married, 0 otherwise 
Single Parent 1 if the declarant is a single parent, 0 otherwise 
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assigned to households that did not disclose any explanation. Each trigger takes the value 1 
if such trigger occurred to the household and 0 otherwise.6 
5. Results 
The following sections are divided in two parts: section 5.1. provides a preliminary analysis 
of the data and the following sections analyze the determinants of household’s financial 
situation using the data described above. The analysis focuses on two different variables: the 
probability of defaulting on financial obligations and the level of debt and expenses burden. 
5.1.  Preliminary Analysis 
In Appendix 3 we provide a Kernel density distribution of the debt burden of households 
from group A and in Appendix 4, a Kernel density distribution of the expenses burden of all 
households. Both distributions are skewed to the left because in our sample, we have included 
households with very high levels of debt or expenses burden. Even though they do not 
represent the majority of our sample, they should not be seen as outliers and should be 
included in our study, as they represent the most severe cases of household’s financial 
problems. 
According to the life-cycle theory of income, one expects the debt burden to increase initially, 
and eventually become decreasing with age. Graphical evidence supporting this statement is 
given in Figure 1, where the relationship between age and the average debt burden of group 
A is plotted. Accordingly, and following Alfaro et al. (2012), we will introduce age2 in the 
regressions. 
                                                          
6 For more information about triggers, see Appendix 2. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Age and average debt burden 
 
 
To check whether households with higher income levels have lower debt or expenses burdens 
or if instead, they have a higher predilection for credit or expenditure, we run two regressions 
of the log of debt and expenses on the log of income. The coefficients for log income are 
0,5504 and 0,4588, respectively, implying that both ratios debt/income and expenses/income 
are decreasing with income.7 
5.2. Determinants of Probability of Defaulting 
I begin by analyzing the determinants of the probability of defaulting by running several 
regressions using the “Defaulting on Financial Obligations” variable as the independent 
variable. We first run a baseline regression and to show that our results are robust, alternative 
measures of the employment status, education level and family composition were applied. 
Table 3 exhibits the results from these regressions. 
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Our results suggest that unemployment, lower levels of education and having children have 
a significant and positive impact on the probability of defaulting, which matches the results 
obtained by Costa (2012), whose paper addresses the probability of defaulting of the 
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Observations 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 
R-squared 0,0864 0,0857 0,0840 0,0848 0,0835 0,0673 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions run using data from GAS collected between 2012 and 2015, with n=6.369 
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Portuguese households. Other papers show similar results: Gerardi et al. (2015) obtained the 
same result for unemployment; Alfaro et al. (2012) found the same relation with the level of 
education, and Brandrup et al. (2011) showed that having children has a positive impact on 
the probability of defaulting, since it puts a greater pressure on the family budget, which is 
likely to provoke arrears on credit commitments and utility bills. Conversely, being married 
has a negative effect on the probability of default, which as explained by Alfaro et al. (2012) 
occurs because married couples tend to have two incomes, which allows them to diversify 
the risk of defaulting. 
Regarding income, Costa (2012) and Alfaro et al. (2012) also showed that income has a 
significant negative impact on the probability of defaulting. Lastly, households with bank 
loans are more prone to default. One possible reason is the fact that households are less likely 
to default on utility bills, as doing so deprives them from using daily basic services, such as 
water or electricity. Therefore, households from group B (without bank loans) tend to default 
less. 
The variable “Defaulting on Financial Obligations” was also regressed against the over-
indebtedness triggers created, excluding the unknown trigger. We run two regressions (OLS 
and Probit) using only triggers and then added control variables to check for the robustness 
of the results. Table 4 shows the results. 
The unemployment trigger exhibits a significant impact, which matches the results obtained 
in Table 3. The same result is obtained for the income reduction trigger. Yet, as one might 
expect, its effect is not as severe as unemployment.  




                                                          
8 Marginal Effects computed at mean Age, Age2 and Income, and with At most Basic Education, With Children 
and Married equal to zero. 
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Observations 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 
R-squared 0,0129 0,0374 0,0095  0,0281  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions run using data from GAS collected between 2012 and 2015, with n=6.369 
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expenses with medications and medical treatments. Furthermore, as Elaine E. Bedel argues 
in an article published by Bedel Financial Consulting, Inc, if having a disease comes with a 
limited capacity to work, income is likely to be reduced, which compromises household’s 
ability to fulfill financial obligations (Bedel Financial Consulting, Inc, 2013). 
As known, a guarantor is someone who guarantees to pay someone else’s debt if he/she 
defaults on a credit commitment, and when such thing occurs, the guarantor is obliged to pay 
the debt. The results show that this circumstance, in turns, impacts the guarantor’s probability 
of defaulting. Similarly, households in which an owned company goes bankrupt (or one in 
which a family member is partner) are more likely to default. 
5.3. Determinants of Debt burden 
In this section we analyze the determinants of the debt burden. As mentioned in the 
descriptive statistics section, the debt burden is the total amount of installments divided by 
the household’s income. We restrict this analysis to households from group A, as they are 
the ones with bank loans, and therefore, installments. The same methodology applied in the 
probability of defaulting is applied here: we run a baseline regression and then provide 
alternative measures of some variables to show that our results are robust. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
As Table 5 shows, age has a significant impact on the debt burden. Age has a positive 
coefficient and Age2 a negative one, which matches the relationship between age and debt 






Regarding unemployment, the results show that being unemployed has a significant positive 
impact on the debt burden level, as concluded by Knobloch et al. (2008), and that having 
children has a significant negative impact. Also, once introduced in the baseline regression, 
income exhibits a significant negative impact on debt burden level. Even though being 
married is not significant, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that, its introduction 




Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Baseline Reg. 
(with Income) 
Debt burden       
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     Employed  
-48,0115** 
(19,8587) 
    
Education       












     Higher Education   
18,6114 
(13,3335) 
   
Family Composition       







    
-16,7528* 
(8,7899) 







    
25,2331 
(15,5781) 












Income      
-0,0795** 
(0,0372) 
Observations 5.864 5.864 5.864 5.864 5.864 5.864 
R-squared 0,0107  0,0076 0,0108 0,0128 0,0086 0,0319 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions run using data from GAS collected between 2012 and 2015, with n=5.864 
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changes its sign to a positive one. A likely explanation is that the negative impact of being 
married seen in the other regressions is now being absorbed by the variable income, and the 
change to a positive sign in the variable married reflects the greater ease in obtaining credit 
that married households have when compared to single households. Yet, this result should be 
taken with a lot of caution, since income is, by construction, an endogenous variable which 
will cause the estimators to be inconsistent. 
5.4. Determinants of Expenses burden 
Lastly, we analyze the determinants of the expenses burden for our entire sample, computed 
as total amount of expenses over income. This analysis is important for two reasons: first, it 
provides a measurement of financial burden that includes households from group B, which 
have also expressed financial difficulties; second, it allows comparisons between the debt 
and expenses burden. The methodology used is the same applied in the debt burden analysis. 
Table 6 presents the results. 
The first difference that we observe is that age is not significant for the expenses burden. On 
the other hand, being unemployed exhibits the same significant positive effect, yet with a 
smaller impact as the coefficient indicates. 
The level of education remains insignificant, while having children maintains its 
significance, yet with a different sign which is now positive, most likely due to increased 
expenditures in groceries, clothing, health and transportation, as Brandrup et al. (2011) 
showed. Still on family composition, the results also reveal that being married and having 
more adults in the household has a negative impact on the ratio, mainly due to household 





Most of the empirical findings of this study confirm previous results found in other studies. 
The results suggest that unemployment is the most relevant determinant of households’ 
probability of defaulting and level of debt and expenses burden as it exhibits a high 
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6,4831 
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Income      
-0,1000 
(0,0615) 
Observations 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 6.369 
R-squared 0,0115 0,0101 0,0115 0,0113 0,0133 0,0640 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions run using data from GAS collected between 2012 and 2015, with n=6.369 
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significance level and a consistent sign of its coefficient across all our outcome variables. 
Family composition, namely being married and having children, seem to be important as 
well, along with the income level. Yet, it should be mentioned that these results do not imply 
causality. 
Over-indebtedness is an issue that affects several Portuguese households, whose impact goes 
beyond the financial one. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to address this problem. 
Understanding the determinants of over-indebtedness allows central, state or local 
institutional units to act on the problem. Their intervention can be through social transfers 
targeted to these families or through the development of institutions like Instituto do Emprego 
e Formação Profissional (IEFP), which can encourage the creation of jobs, strengthen more 
stable work contracts and tackle precariousness in the labor market.  
We should highlight that these results are not representative of the overall Portuguese 
population, as they focus specifically on households that perceive themselves as over-
indebted. To deepen our understanding about the problem, an on-going study of the topic 
with a more diverse sample is necessary. Only in this way will it be possible to tackle the 
problems that such phenomenon entails. 
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                                                               Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics per group  
  Group A - Households with bank loans Group B - Households without bank loans  
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 




Income 5.864 1.069,10 708,96 42,28 13.050,00 505 1.068,11 1.096,92 42,28 17.095,00 0,0284 




Fixed 5.864 112,02 135,85 0,00 1.433,00 505 125,68 147,09 0,00 1.150,00 -2,1548 
Transportation 5.864 40,38 114,61 0,00 2.400,00 505 45,62 127,25 0,00 1.165,00 -0,9782 
Education 5.864 14,02 73,22 0,00 2.316,00 505 14,53 73,77 0,00 900,00 -0,1493 
Taxes 5.864 38,57 82,91 0,00 3.577,59 505 31,36 51,43 0,00 400,00 1,9224 
Health 5.864 502,10 324,27 0,00 6.049,00 505 599,65 873,46 0,00 18.211,00 -5,3049 
Incidental 5.864 34,50 117.60 0,00 2.600,00 505 38,02 145,23 0,00 1.700,00 -0,6324 
Telecommunications 5.864 47,42 38,33 0,00 690,00 505 51,43 57,92 0,00 750,00 -2,1513 




Housing 5.864 194,83 279,85 0,00 6.707,18 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 15,6442 
Car 5.864 99,07 1026,34 0,00 48.112,05 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,1691 
Personal 5.864 333,99 1.190,05 0,00 34.482,00 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,3064 
Credit Card 5.864 300,16 802,91 0,00 17.263,01 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 8,4004 
Other 5.864 48,47 321,93 0,00 11.463,00 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,3833 
Total Installments 5.864 976,53 1.913,83 1,00 51.521,46 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 11,4656 
Burdens (%) 
Expenses 5.864 113,99 261,12 0,63 5.082,86 505 190,23 454,50 0,43 5.228,78 -5,8437 
Debt (Service) 5.864 125,82 330,59 0,13 8.362,07 505 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 8,5519 
With Bank Loans 5.864 1 0 1 1 505 0 0 0 0 . 
Defaulting on Financial Obligations 5.864 0,62 0,49 0 1 505 0,16 0,37 0 1 20,4820 
Age 
Age 5.864 47,85 11,99 21 88 505 44,89 11,22 22 98 5,3615 




Unemployed 5.864 0,27 0,44 0 1 505 0,26 0,44 0 1 0,1549 
Employed 5.864 0,59 0,49 0 1 505 0,68 0,47 0 1 -4,0045 
Education 
At most Basic Education 5.864 0,48 0,50 0 1 505 0,38 0,48 0 1 4,6735 
Higher Education 5.864 0,15 0,36 0 1 505 0,18 0,38 0 1 -1,8737 
Family 
Composition 
With Children 5.864 0,56 0,50 0 1 505 0,59 0,49 0 1 -0,9578 
Married 5.864 0,55 0,50 0 1 505 0,52 0,50 0 1 1,3118 
Number of children 5.864 0,86 0,92 0 6 505 0,91 0,94 0 5 -1,2159 
Number of adults 5.864 1,67 0,61 1 7 505 1,63 0,60 1 5 1,2338 




Unemployment 5.864 0,33 0,47 0 1 505 0,22 0,42 0 1 5,1064 
Income Reduction 5.864 0,33 0,47 0 1 505 0,17 0,38 0 1 7,4120 
Family Increase 5.864 0,06 0,23 0 1 505 0,04 0,19 0 1 2.0916 
Family Decrease 5.864 0,07 0,26 0 1 505 0,04 0,19 0 1 2.8609 
Disease 5.864 0,12 0,33 0 1 505 0,06 0,23 0 1 4,6134 
Guarantor 5.864 0,03 0,16 0 1 505 0,01 0,12 0 1 1,6110 
Own Company Bankruptcy 5.864 0,04 0,21 0 1 505 0,03 0,16 0 1 1,9946 
Poor Management 5.864 0,15 0,36 0 1 505 0,11 0,31 0 1 2,6489 
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Appendix 2: Over-indebtedness triggers 
Unemployment Long-term or short-term unemployment 
Income Reduction 
Reduction in base salary; Reduction or loss of commissions, allowances or 
overtime pay; Payment delays; Liens; Retirement 
Family Increase Childbirth; Support to family member(s) 
Family Decrease Divorce; Separation; Death of household member(s) 
Disease Diseases; Illnesses; Disabilities; Chronic diseases; Hospital treatments 
Guarantor Enforcement of guarantor obligations 
Own Company Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy of owned company; Bankruptcy of company in which a family 
member is partner 
Poor Management Mismanagement of household’s budget; Too much expenses; Too much credits 
Unknown Households which did not provide a description of their financial situation 
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